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We also, inthis paper, leave untouched the general question of
the value of the jury system. When such able and thoughtful men
as Prof. EMORY WASHBURN and Prof. JAMES V. CAMPBELL appear as

its champions, after all the adverse criticism that recently has been
lavished upon it, we may feel assured that there are still reasons
in its support which lie deep in the philosophy of the human mind.'
T. M. 0.
RECENT

AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of the United States.
CHARLES T. CR0MWELL v. THE COUNTY OF SAC.
The difference between the effect of a judgment as a bar or estoppel against the
prosecution of a second action upon the same claim or demand, and its effect as an
estoppel in another action between the same parties upon a different claim or cause
of action, stated. "In the former case the judgment, if rendered upon the merits,
constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action. It is a finality as to the claim
or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not
only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or dereat the
claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been
offered for that purpose. But where the second action between the same parties is
upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an
estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.
In an action against a county in Iowa upon certain interest coupons originally
attached to bonds issued by the county for the erection of a court-house, it was:
found and determined that the bonds were void as against the county in the hands
of parties who did not acquire them before maturity for value; and, inasmuch as
the plaintiff in that action had not proved that he had given such value, it was
adjudged that he was not entitled to recover: Held, that the judgment did not
estop the plaintiff holding other bonds of the same series, and other coupons
attached to the same bonds as the coupons in the original action, from showing in
a second attion against the county that he acquired such other bonds and coapona
for value before maturity.
The finding in one action that the plaintiff therein is the holder and owner ofr
certain coupons in suit,,does not estop the defendant from showing in another
doctrine had not generally been accepted, but the liability to a second punishment
is not to be overlooked in any consideration of the true bearings of these cases. In
the recent case of ,Storey v. People, 79 Ill. 45, the Supreme Court of Illinois decide,
as we understand it, that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and of
the press precludes the court punishing, as a contempt of its authority, a libel in a
newspaper upon the court or its officers not directly calculated to hinder, delay or
obstruct the court in the exercise of its proper functions.
I Reference is here made to the paper by Prof. WASsnuHN in the Forum, vol. S..
p. 601, and to that by Prof. CJYpSzLL in the Michigan Lawyer 1876.
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-action that such plaintiff prosecuted the first action for the use and benefit of the
plaintiff in the second action. The finding only establishes the fact that such
plaintiff held the legal title to the coupons, which was sufficient for the purpose of
the action, and was not inconsistent with an equitable and beneficial interest in
another.

I-N error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the district
of Iowa.
This was an action on four bonds of the county of Sac, in the
state of Iowa, each for $1000, and four coupons for interest, attached
to them, each for $100. The bonds Were issued in 1860, and were
made payable to bearer, in the city of New York, in the years 1868,
1869, 1870, and 1871 respectively, with annual interest at the rate
of ten per cent. a year.
To defeat this action the defendant relied upon the estoppel of a
judgment rendered in favor of the county in a prior action brought
by one Samuel C. Smith upon certain earlier maturing coupons on
the same bonds, accompanied with proof that the plaintiff, Cromwell,
was at the time the owner of the coupons in that action, and thit
the action was prosecuted for his sole use and benefit.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FIELD, J.-The questions presented for our determination relate.
to the operation of this judgment as an estoppel against the prose,cution of the present action, and the admissibility of the evidence
-to connect the present plaintiff with the former action as a real
,party in interest.

In considering the operation of this judgment, it should be borne
in mind, as stated by counsel, that there is a difference between the
-effect .of a judgment as a bar or estoppel against the prosecution of
a second action upon the same claim or demand, and its effect as an
estoppel in another action between the same parties upon a different
claim or cause of action. In the former case the judgment, if rendered upon the merits, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent
action. It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy,
concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only.as to
-every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the
claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might.
have been offered for that purpose. Thus, for example, a judgment
rendered upon a promissory note is conclusive as to the validity of
the instrument and the amount due upon it, although it be subsequently alleged.that perfect defences actually existed, of which no
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proof was offered, such as forgery, want of consideration, or payment. If such defences were not presented in the action and established by competent evidence, the subsequent allegation of their
existence is of no legal consequence. The judgment is as conclusive,
so far as future proceedings at law are concerned, as though the
defences never existed. The language, therefore, which is so often
used, that a judgment estops not only as to every ground of recovery or defence actually presented in the action, but also as to every
ground which might have been presented, is strictly accurate when
applied to the demand or claim in controversy. Such demand or
claim having passed into judgment cannot again be brought into
litigation between the parties in proceedings at law upon any ground
whatever.
But where the second action between the same parties is upon a
different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates
as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted,
upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.'
In all cases, therefore, wherq it is sought to apply the estoppel of a
judgment rendered upon one cause of action to matters arising in a
suit upon a different cause of action, the inquiry must always be as
to the point or question actually litigated and determined in the
original action, not what might have been thus litigated and determined. Only upon such matters is the judgment conclusive in another action.
The difference in the operation of a judgment in the two classes
of cases mentioned is seen through all the leading adjudications upon
the doctrine of estoppel. Thus,. in the case of Outram v. 'orewood, 3 East 346, the defendants were held estopped from
averrinV title to a mine in an action of trespass for digging out
coal from it, because in a previous action for a similar trespass they
had set up the same title and it had been determined against them.
In commenting upon a decision cited in that case Lord ELLEN-BOROUGH, in his elaborate opinion, said: "It is not the .recovery,
but the matter alleged by the party, and upon which the recovery
proceeds, which creates the estoppel. The recovery of itself in an
action of trespass is only a bar to the future recovery of damages
for the same injury, but the estoppel precludes parties and privies
from contending to the contrary of that point or matter of fact,
which having bben once distinctly put in issue by them, or by those
to whom they are privy in estate or law, has been, on* such issue
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joined, solemnly found against them." And in the case of Gardner v. Buckbee, 3 Cowen 120, it was held by the Supreme Court
of New York, that a verdict and judgment in the Marine Court of
the city of New York upon one of 'two notes given upon a sale of a
vessel, that tlhe sale was fraudulent, the vessel being at the time
unseaworthy, were c'onclusive upon the question of the character of
the sale in an action upon the other note between the same parties
in the Court of Common Pleas. The rule laid down in the celebrated opinion in the case of the Ducwes of Kingston Was cited,
and followed: ".That the judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction directly upon the point is as a plea a bar, or as evidence conclusive between the same parties upon the same matter directly in
question in another court."
These cases usually cited in support of the doctrine that the determination of a question directly involved in one action is conclusive as to that question in a second suit between the same parties
upon a different cause of action, negative the proposition that the
estoppel can extend beyond the point actually litigated and determined. The argument in these cases, that a particular point was
necessarily involved in the finding in the original action, proceeded
upon the theory that if not thus involved the judgment would be
inoperative as an estoppel. In the case of Ales v. (aldwell, 2
Wall. 85, a judgment in ejectment in Missouri, where actions of
that kind stand, with respect to the operation of a recovery therein,
as a bar or estoppel, in the same position as other actions, was held
by this court conclusive, in a subsequent suit in equity between the
parties respecting the title, upon the question of the satisfaction of
the mortgage under which the plaintiff claimed title to the premises
in the ejectment, and the question as to the fraudulent character
of the mortgage under which the defendant claimed, because these
questions had been submitted to the jury in that action, and had
been passed upon by them. The court held, after full consideration,
that in cases of tort, equally as in those arising upon contract,
where the form of the issue was so vague as not to show the questions
of fact submitted to the jury, it was competent to prove by parol
testimony what question or questions of fact were thus submitted
and necessarily passed upon by them: and by inevitable implication
also held that in the absence of proof in such cases the verdict and
judgment were inconclusive, except as t9 the particular trespass
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alleged, whatever possible questions might have been raised and
determined.
But it is not necessary to take this doctrine as a matter of inference from these cases. The precise point has been adjudged in
numerous instances. It was so adjudged by this court in the case
of Tie Washington, Alexandria & Georgetown Steam Packet (o.
v. Sickles, 24 How. 333. In that case an action was brought upon
a special parol contract for the use of Sickles's cut-off for saving fuel
in the working of steam-engines, by which the plaintiffs, who had
a patent for the cut-off, were to attach one of their machines to the
engine of the defendants' boat, and were to receive for its use threefourths of the saving of fuel thus produced, the payments to be made
from time to time when demanded. To ascertain the saving of fuel
an experiment was to be made in a specified manner, and the result
taken as the rate of saving during the continuance of the contract.
The plaintiffs in their declaration averred that the experiment had
been made, the rate of saving ascertained, and that the cut-off
had been used on the boat until the commencement of the suit. In
a prior action against the same defendant for an instalment due,
where the declaration set forth the same contract in two counts, the
first of which was similar to the counts in the second action, and
also the common counts, the plaintiffs had obtained verdict and
judgment, and it was insisted that the defendant was estopped by
the verdict, and judgment produced from proving that there was no
such contract as that declared upon, or that no saving of fuel had
been obtained, or that the experiment was not made pursuant to the
contract, or that the verdict was rendered upon all the issues, and
not upon the first count specially. The Circuit Court assented to
these vius and excluded the testimony offered by the defendants to
prove tliose facts. But this court reversed the decision, and held
that the defendants were not thus estopped.
"The record produced by the plaintiffs," said the court, "showed
that the first suit was brought apparently upon the same contract
as the second, and that the existence and validity of that contract
might have been litigated. But the verdict might have been rendered upon the entire declaration, and without special reference to
the first count. It was competent to the defendants to show the
state of facts that existed at the trial, with a view to ascertain what
was the matter decided.upon by the verdict of the jury. It may
have been that there was no contest in reference to the fairness of
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the experiment, or to its sufficiency to ascertain the premium to be
paid for the use of the machine at the first trial, or it may have been
that the plaintiffs abandoned their special counts and recovered their
verdict upon the general counts. The judgment rendered in that
suit, while it remains in force, and for the purpose of maintaining
its validity, is conclusive of all the facts properly pleaded by the
plaintiffs; but when it is presented as testimony in another suit,
the inquiry is competent whether the same issue has been tried and
settled by it."
It is not believed that there are any cases going to the extent
that because in the prior action a different question from that actually
determined might have arisen and been litigated, therefore such possible question is to be considered as excluded from consideration in
a second action between the same parties on a different demand,
although loose remarks looking in that direction may be found in
some opinions. On principle a point not in litigation in one action
cannot be received as conclusively settled in any subsequent action
upon a different cause, because it might have been determined in
the first action.
Various considerations, other than the actual merits, may govern
a party in bringing forward grounds of recovery or defence in one
action, which may not exist in another action upon a different demand, such as the smallness of the amount or the value of the property in controversy, the difficulty of obtaining the necessary evidence, the expense of the litigation, and his own situation at the
time. A party acting upon considerations like these ought not be
precluded from contesting in a subsequent action other demands
arising out of the same transaction. A judgment by default only
admits for the purpose of the action the legality of the demand or
claim in suit; it does not make the allegations of the declaration or
complaint evidence in an action upon a different claim. The declaration may contain different statements of the cause of action in
different counts. It could hardly be pretended that a judgment by
default in such a case would make the several statements evidence
in any other proceeding: Boyleau v. .Rutlin, 2 Exch. 665, 681,
and Hugies v. Alexander, 5 Duer 493.
The case of Howlett v. Tarte, 10 0. B. N. S. 813, supports this
view. This was an action for rent under a building agreement.
The defendant pleaded a subsequent agreement changing the tenancy into one from year to year, and its determination by notice
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to quit before the time for which the rent sued for was alleged to have
accrued. The plaintiff replied that he had recovered a judgment
in a former action against the defendant for rent under the same
agreement, which had accrued after the alleged determination of
the tenancy, in which action the defendant did not set up the defence pleaded in the second action. On demurrer the replication,
after full argument, was held bad. In deciding the case Mr. Justice WILLES said: "It is quite right that a defendant should be
estopped from setting up in the lsame action a defence which he
might have pleaded, but has chosen to let the proper time go by.
But nobody ever heard of a defendant being precluded from setting
up a defence in a second action because he did not avail himself of
the opportunity of setting it up in the first action. * * * I think
we should do wrong to favor the introduction of this new device
into the law.'" Mr. Justice BYLES said: "It is plain that there is
no authority for saying that the defendait is precluded from setting
up this defence." Mr. Justice KEATING said: "This is an attempt
on the part of the plaintiff to extend the doctrine of estoppel far
beyond what any of the authorities warrant."
The language of the Vice-chancellor, in the case of Hendersonv.
Henderson, 3 Hare 100, 115, is sometimes cited as expressing a
different opinion, but upon examining the facts of that case it will
appear that the language used in'no respect conflicts with the doctrine we have stated. In that case a bill had been filed in the Supreme Court of Newfoundland by the next of kin of an intestate
against A. and others for an account of an estate and of certain
partnership transactions. A decree was rendered against A., upon
which the next of kin brought actions in England. A. then filed
a bill there against the next of kin and personal representative of
the intestate, stating that the intestate's estate was indebted to him,
and alleging various errors and irregularities in the proceedings in
the Supreme Court of the island, and praying that the estate of the
intestate might be administered, the partnership accounts taken,
and the .amount of the debt due to-him ascertained and paid. A
demurrer to the bill was allowed for want of equity, on the ground
that the whole of the matters were in question between the parties,
and might properly have been the subject of adjudication in the suit
before that court. It was with reference to the necessity of having "
the subject of particular litigation as a whole at once before the court'
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and not by piecemeal, that the Vice-chancellor said: "In trying
this question I believe I state the rule of court correctly, that when
a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the
parties to bring forward their whole case, and will not, except under
special circumstances, permit the same parties to open the same
subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been
brought forward as part of the subject in controversy, but which
was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence,
inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of the case. The plea
of res adjudicata applies, except in special cases, not only to the
points upon which the court was required by the parties to form an
opinion, and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties,
exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the
time."
There is nothing in this language, applied to the facts of the
case, which gives support to the doctrine that'whenever in one
action a party might have brought forward a particular ground of
recovery or defence, anj neglected to do so, he is, in a subsequent
suit between the same parties upon a different cause of action, precluded from availing himself of such ground.
If now we consider the main question presented for our determination by the light of the views thus expressed and the authorities
cited, its solution will not be difficult. It appears from the findings
in the original action of Smith, that the county of Sac, by a vote
of its people, authorized the issue of bonds to the amount of ten
thousand dollars for the erectiop of a court-house; that bonds to
that amount were issued by the county judge and were delivered
to one Meserey, with whom he had made a contract for the erection
of the court-house; that immediately upon receipt of the bonds,
the contractor gave one of them as a gratuity to the county judge;
and that the court-house was never constructed by the contractor,
or by any other person pursuant to the contract. It also appears
that the plaintiff had become before their maturity the holder of
twenty-five coupons which had been attached to the bonds; but
there was no finding that he had ever given aiy value for them.
The court below held upon these findings that the bonds were -void
as against the county and gave judgment accordingly. The case
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coming here on writ of error, this court held that the facts disclosed
by the findings were sufficient evidence of fraud and .illegality in
the inception of the bonds as to call upon the holder to show that
he had given value for the coupons, and not having done so, the
judgment was affirmed. Reading the record of the lower court by
the opinion and judgment of this court, it must be considered that
the matters adjudged in that case were these: that the bonds were
void as against the county in the hands of parties who did not
acquire them before maturity and give value for them; and that
the plaintiff, not having proved that he gave such value, was not
entitled to recover upon the coupons. Whatever illegality or fraud
there was in the issue and delivery to the contractor of the bonds,
affected equally the coupons for interest attached to them. The
finding and judgment upon the invalidity of the bonds as against
the county must be held to estop the plaintiff here from averring
to the contrary. But as the bonds were negotiable instruments,
and their issue was authorized by a vote of the county, and they
recite on their face a compliance with the law providing for their
issue, they would be held as valid obligations against the county in
the hands of a bong fide holder taking them for value before maturity, according to repeated decisions of this court upon the character of such obligations. If, therefore, the plaintiff received the bond
and coupons in suit before maturity for value, as he offered to prove,
he should have been permitt~d to show that fact. There was nothing
adjudged in the former action in the finding that the plaintiff had
not made such proof in that case which can preclude the present
plaintiff from making such proof here. The fact that a party may
not have shown that he gave value for one bond or coupon is not
even presumptive, much less conclusive, evidence that be may not
have given value for another and different bond or coupon. The
exclusion of the evidence offered by the plaintiff was erroneous,
and for the ruling of the court in that respect the judgment must
be reversed and a new trial had.
Upon the second question presented we think the court below
ruled correctly. Evidence showing that the action of Smith was
brought for the sole use and benefit of the present plaintiff was, in
our jildgment, admissible. The finding that Smith was the holder
and owner of the coupons in suit went only to this extent, that he
held the legal title to them, which was sufficient for the purpose of
VOL. XXV.-92
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the action, and was not inconsistent with an equitable and beneficial
interest in another.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded for a new trial.
CLIFFORD,

J., dissented.

It is laid down in the principal case
that L ' where the second action between
the same parties is upon a different claim
or demand, the judgment in the prior
action operates as an estoppel * * * as
to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of
which the finding or verdict was rendered."
There is, however, a liuc of
decisions which narrows the estoppel to
the matter upon which the plaintiff proceeds by his action and which the dqfendant controverts by his pleading. It is
the object of this uote to indicate the
current of authority on this point, and
especially the tendency of the modem
decisions.
It can hardly be doubted that if the
cause of action be decided upon a title
which is brought into issue by the pleadings and made part of the record, th'e
verdict and judgment in that action
will estop parties 'and privies in estate
from disputing, not only the claim or
demand in controversy, but the title
which has thus been solemnly passed
upon by a court of concurrent jurisdiction. The diversity of judicial opinion
arises when it is sought to include in
the estoppel facts necessarily involved
in the finding, or shown by parol to
have been the ground of such finding,
but not the matter upon which the plain-.
tiff proceeds by his action: and which the
defendant controverts by his pleading.
The leading English case on this
subject is Barrs v. J.ackson, 1 Y. & C.
C. C. 585. Harriet Smith having died
intestate, application for letters of administration on her estate was made
both by Barrs and Jackson. The Ecclesiastical Court decided that Jackson was
the lawful second cousin and, next of
kin of the intestate, and that Barrs had

failed in proof that she was the lawful
niece of the intestate ; and granted
administration to Jackson. A bill was
then brought in chancery by 3arrs
against Jackson as administrator praying for account and payment over to
her as next of kin of the intestate. The
defendant by his answer relied on the
proceedings in the Ecclesiastical Court.
The plaintiff offered fresh evidence of
her relationship to the intestate. ViceChancellor Knight BRuc E granted an
issue, saying: "It is I think to be collected that the rule against re-agitating
matter adjudicated is subject generally
to this restriction, that however essential
the establishment of particular facts may
be to the soundness of a judicial decision
* * those facts are not all necessarily
established conclusively between the
parties, and that either may again litigate them for any other purpose as to
which they may come into question,
provided the immediate subject of the
decision be not attempted to be withdrawn from its operation so as to defeat
its direct object." On appeal, however
(s. c. 1 Phillips 582), the decree was
reversed by Lord Chancellor LyscoHURST, who held himself bound by
Botchier v. Taylor, 4 B. P. C. 708, and
reconciled the cases by the rule that
matters directly put at issue and decided
between the same parties are concluded,
but not matters which are only to :be
inferred from the judgment. The case
of Outran v. Moreword, 3 East 346, is
directly to the point that IIthe matter
alleged by the party and on which the
recoveryproceeds," creates the estoppel ;
and Carter v. James, 13 M. & W. 137,
is not in conflict with this decision. All
which is involved in that case is that no
estoppel arises as to facts not of record,
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which might have been, but were not,
controverted in the previous action. See
to the same effect Htowlett v. Tarte, 10
C. B. N. S. 813. There are also a
class of cases on the settlement of paupers, where the justices' order of removal has been held conclusive, not
only of the status of the pauper, but of
all facts" necessary to their finding.
Compare Regina v. &ow, 5 Q. B. 93, with
Regina v. Hartington, 4 E. & B. 780.
"A judgment concludes," says COLERIDGE, J., in the latter case, after an
examination of the Dachess of Kingston's
Case, "1not merely as to the point
actually decided, but as to matter which
it was necessary to decide; and which
was actually decided as the groundwork
of the decision itself, though not then
directly the point at issue." Regina v.
Sow is to the same effect, except that
the court refused to receive the examinations in evidence to show on what
ground the order of removal had been
made; COLERIDGE, J., saying : "The
order is conclusive as to what is necessarily involved in it; but.the question
is whether you can prove in this way
that a particular fact was so, the fact
not appearing on the face of the order."
And no case has been found in the
English reports which permits verbal
evidence to be given that facts not
necessarily involved in the finding were
the only matters at issue, for the purpose of estopping the parties from contesting those facts in a subsequent'proceeding.
In America the current of authority
is in favor of admitting parol evidence
to show on what point the finding was
reached. The doctrine is thus expressed
by CAMPBELL, J., in Packet Co. v.
Sicdles, 24 How. 333, " It is not necessary as between parties and privies that
the record should show the question
upon which the right of the plaintiff to
recover or the validity of the defence
depended, for it to operate conclusively;
but only that the same matter might

have been litigated, and extrinsic evidence will be admitted to prove that the
particular question was material, andwas in fact contested, and that it was
referred to the decision of the jury."
When the same case came up in 1866
(5 Wall. 580), it was said by the court,
"1If the record of the former trial shows
that the verdict could not have been
rendered without deciding the particular
matter, it will be considered as having
settled that matter as to all future
actions between the parties ; and further,
in cases where the record itself does not
show that the matter was necessarily
and directly found by the jury, evidence
aliunde consistent with the record may
be received to prove the fact ; but even
where it appears from the extrinsic evidence that the matter was properly
within the issue controverted in the
former suit, if it be not shown that the
verdict and judgment necessarily involved its consideration and determination, it will not be concluded." See also
the dissenting opinion of MILLER, J.
The majority of the state courts have
arrived at a similar conclusion; and
the tendency of the later cases is markedly towards allowing the actual point
on which the decision turned to be given.
in evidence, though not indicated by
the pleadings or judgment, for the purpose of making an end of litigation.
This is said in some cases to be a result
of the loose modern system of pleading,
which renders it often impossible to
ascertain from the record the real issue
before the jury. See Packet Co. v.
Sickles, 24 How. 343 ; Sawger v. Moodbury, 7 Gray 499.
The narrower rule will be well illustrated by the decision in King v. Chase,
15 N. H. 9. This was an action in
trespass for taking certain hay, the title
to which- was in the plaintiff by virtue
of a certain mortgage. The defendant
gave in evidence the record of a former
action in trover for taking oats described
in the same mortgage ;. verdict, not
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guilty. He then offered parol evidence
to show that the only question submitted
to the jury and determined by them was
as to the fraudulent character of the
mortgage under which the plaintiff
claimed. The court below received the
evidence, and the jury found for the
defendant ; but the Superior Court set
aside the verdict and, granted a new
trial. PARKER, C. J., laid down the
distinction that while parol evidence was
admissible to show that the verdict in
the former action was given on the
plaintiff's want of title to the oats,
as distinguished from the defendant's
conversion, it was'not admissible to
prove on what ground the verdict proceeded. "The title which has been
tried was only his (the plaintiff's) title
to the oats. The question whether the
mortgage was fraudulent came up only
incidentally, by reason of his relying
on that as his title. But the mortgage
"\was not the matter in issue." The rule
thus laid down is affirmed in Palmer v.
Russell, 43 N. H. 625, where the question is treated as settled in that state by
the authority of King v. Chase.
Some of the earlier New York cases
are to the same effect: Lawrence v.
Hunt, 10 Wendell 88; Manning v.
Harris, 2 Johns. 24. But see contra,
Burt v. Sternburgh, 4 Cowen 559, 562 ;
Gardner v. Biurk.bee, 3 Id. 120; and
Jackson v. Wood, 3 Wendell 278, where
the question was thoroughly argued,
the Court of Errors overruling the
decision below. The later *cases have
followed in this path. Thus in Frantz
v. Ireland,4 Lansing 278 (187 1), where,
as an estoppel in an action for land, the
record of a previous judgment was introduced in which no land was described,
parol evidence was admitted to show
that the title to the same land was
thereby determined; TALCOTT, J.,
saying that, where it was not inconsistent with the record, "the party
seeking to avail himself of the former
recovery may show by parol or other-

wise that the precise point was litigated
and determined." Demarest v. Darg,
32 N. Y. 281, is directly in point. In
Bissell v. Kellogg, 60 Barb. 617 (1871),
a specification by the judge of the ground
of his finding was held conclusive in a
subsequent suit. In Bissick v. McKenzie, 4 Daly 265 (1872), a previous
action had been brought on two promissory notes, the defence to which was
that these notes, together with a balance
on book account had been paid by
giving a bond and mortgage. A verdict
for the plaintiff in this case was held
conclusive in a subsequent suit for the
balance on book account, in which the
same defence was set up. See, finally,
Bush v. Knox, 2 Hun 576 (1874), where
the decisions are reviewed, and the court
says, "No cases are cited of a recent
date which conflict with the principle
laid down" in Demarest v. Darg.
In Pennsylvania, Hibshman v. Dulleban, 4 Watts 183, and Lentz v. Wallace,
5 Harris 114, seem to affirm the principle of King v. Chase. In HibshmaX v.
Dalleban, the finding of the Orphans'
Court, inter ella, that a release of legacy
was valid, was held not to estop the
litigation of that question by an action
on the case for the legacy ; but note that
the Orphans' Court had no jurisdiction
over such.an action, and so it was said
by HA S, J., below ; note also that the
point was not necessarily decided, as
the same conclusion would have been
reached by the Orphans' Court on other
grounds ; it was a "gratuitous determination." In Lentz v. Wallace, parol
evidence offered to supplement the
record was rejected, apparently on the
ground that the party might have filed
a bill of particulars. "The notes of
judge and counsel, even when supported
by the testimony of ' one of the jurors,'
furnish but imperfect and uncertain
means of ascertaining the real ground
of the former aecision ;" per Lzwis, J.
Tams v. Lewis, 42 Penna.
St. 402,
sometimes cited on the same side, is in

CROMWELL v. THE COUNTY OF SAC.
reality an authority against it. There
was held to be no estoppel in that case,
as the facts, though traversed in the
previous action, were immaterial to its
decision; but, per SraoNo, J., "a
former verdict and judgment between
the same parties is conclusive of every
fact which was essential to the adjudication * * " either from the record or
aliande." Lewis 6- Ndson's Appeal, 17
P. F. Smith 153, does not appear to conflict with this dictum. The broader
principle was laid down in Peterson v.
Lathrop, 11 Casey 222, where a verdict
that the discharge of a bankrupt had
been obtained by fraud was held conclusive of the fraud ; and in Stevens v.
Hughes, 7 Casey 381. The law on this
point, however, has not yet received any
conclusive and authoritative settlement
in Pennsylvania.
The Massachusetts cases were reviewed in Burlen v. Shannon, 99 Mass.
200 (1869), by FOSTER, J., to the%
effect that all facts necessary to the
previous judgment are conclusively established "upon the obviqus principle
that when a conclusion is indisputable
and could have been drawn only from
certain premises, the premises. are
equally indisputable with the conclusion, and that parol proof is admissible
to show what question only was submitted to the jury." In the especial
case before him, he decided that there
was no estoppel to contest a fact upon
which the former judgment was not
ne~cssarily based. In Bates v. Santom,
116 Mass. 120, it was held that evidence that the same facts had been
passed upon in a different claim should
have been, admitted. The law may,
therefore, after much judicial hesitation
and doubt, be considered as settled in
this state.
To the same effect are the decisions
in Alabama (Chamberlain v. Gaillard,
26 Ala. 504), California (Jackson v.
Lodge, 36 Cal. 28), Connecticut (Smith
v. Sherwood, 4 Conn. 276), Maine

(Chase v. Walker, 26 Maine 555), Missouri (Ridyley v. Stilwell, 37 Mo. 128)
and Ohio (Babcock v. Camp, 12 Ohio
N. S. 11).
No case has been found within the
last ten years which explicitly lays down
the 'narrower rule, and it is believed
that even in New Hampshire it would
now be disavowed. The reasoning of
Mr. Bigelow in his valuable work appears to be conclusive on this head.
Estoppel by judgment is founded upon
the reasonable doctrine that where a
party has had his day in court, when he
has had full opportunity of establishing
or refuting certain facts, those facts
shall not again be drawn into controversy. The protection of this doctrine
should, therefore, extend to the substantial issue at the trial, on which the
case turned, and to which the minds of
parties, judge and jury were directed.
See Bigelow on Estoppel, 2d ed., p. 88,
n. 4.
That this reasoning has availed to
extend the scope of estoppel by judgment in this country will appear from a
comparison of REDFIELD, J.'s, opinion
in Gray v. Pingry, 17 Verm. 419, with

his note to Piper v. Gilmore, in the
Am. Law Reg. N. S., vol, 3, p. 590.
In the former case, after discussing the
general doctrine, he goes on to say that
if the matter be not specially pleaded,
"it is said" that the record and finding
in the previous case are not conclusive;
and adds : "My own opinion is that the
former finding, even when it is necessary to resort to oral evidence to ascertain that the fact in dispute was involved
in the former controversy, is still conclusive on the parties, and of course on
the jury." In his note to Piper v...
Gilmore, "We have long been impressed
with the wonderful advance made by the
American courts in the last thirty years,
in giving a conclusive effect to estoppels
of allkinds * * *. It seemed tous that
this last case (Gray v. Pingry) carried
the doctrine of estoppels of record to the
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utmost verge, the very ntima thule of
the law at that time. But it has already
advanced far beyond the point there
assumcd ***

.

We have always re-

garded the rule of law by which a former
verdict is made to apply as an estoppel
to matters and questions not defined
upon the record, and which cannot be
determined in any after-proceeding without resort to parol proof, involving an
inquiry into the deliberations of the
jury-room, as having carried this doctrine quite up to the extreme limit of
safety." But the doctrine has not halted
at the point indicated by the learned
judge, and the result of the later cases
may be thus summed up:I. That a verdict and judgment are
conclusive of all matters upon which
the finding is based : that is,
(1) Of all matters necessarily pre-.
supposed by the finding;
(2) Of all matters shown to have
been the basis of such finding.

1I. That parol evidence is admissible to show what facts, not inconsistent with the record, were necessarily or actually the ground of the
finding.
ITI. It may be added that proof either
by the record or aliunde, that a certain
issue was passed on at the previous trial,
will not render the finding an estoppel
as to that issue, unless it was necessarily
involved in the decision. The extreme
doctrine that any fact shown to have
been submitted to the jury, and on which
the finding might have been based, will
be considered as adjudicated between the
parties, has been strenuously denied and
discredited. When the facts are not
necessarily involved in the previous
finding, the burden should apparently
be in every case upon the party alleging
the estoppel to show that these facts, and
no others, were the ground of such
finding.
RICHARD S. HUNTER. -

Supreme Judikial Court of Ma8sachugett.
COMMONWEALTH v. JOHN F. COSTELLO.
A defendant, in an indictment for forgery, has no right to be personally present
at the hearing of a motion in his behalf for a new trial ; and his absence, though
in jail, will not inialidate a sentence subsequently passed upon him when he is
present.
The court will not hear or determine such a motion if the defendant is not
within its control ; not because he is entitled to be present, but because the court
will not hear him unless he is there to-abide by the decision.
INDICTMENT for forgery. At the trial in the Superior Court,
the defendant was found guilty, and, before sentence, filed a motion
for a new trial. This motion was heard and overruled in the absence
of the defendant, while he was confined in jail. Neither the defendant nor his counsel expressed a wish that he should be present at
the bearing.
The defendant, on being called up for sentence, filed a motion in
arrest of judgment for the following reasons:"1. It does not appear of record that he was present when and
while the motion for. a new trial was heard and tried, and when the
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same was decided by the court, and no reason or excuse appears
therefor.
" 2. In truth and in fact, said motion was heard and tried, and
witnesses examined upon the same both in his own behalf and in
behalf of the government, in the direct and in cross-examination,
the arguments made, and the decision of the court pronounced
thereoin, in his absence, and not while he was present in court, as
required by law; that he was, during all of said time, confined in
jail under an arrest on said indictment, and held to bail, which he
was unable to give; that he was subject to the control of the court,
and could have been brought by the government into court at the
hearing, and wished to be present; that he had no opportunity to
confront the witnesses against him, as entitled by the constitution
and the laws."
The facts stAted in the motion were not controverted by the government.

A. A. Banney and H. B. Swasey, for the defendant.
. B. Train, Attorn6y-General, and

. 0. Loring, Assistant

Attorney-General, for the Commonwealth, were not called upon.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GRAY, C. J.-The rule that a defendant has the right to be present at every step of the proceedings against him in behalf of the
Commonwealth, from arraignment to sentence, does not apply to a
motion for a new trial, which is not a necessary step in those proceedings, and is not made by the Commonwealth, but by the defendant himself, and is addressed to the discretion of the court, and is
not followed by any new judgment against him.
When the defendant is already in custody, it has never been the
practice in this Commonwealth to require his presence at the making,
the hearing or the decision of a motion in his behalf for a new trial.
When he is not in custody, the court will not entertain such a motion in his absence, not because he has a right to be present; but
because h6 has no right to be heard, without submitting himself to
the control of the court, so that he may be committed in case the
motion should be overruled, or as was said by Lord HARDWICKE, in
a case which, like this, was an indictment for forgery, "the court
will be sure of him," before they intimate any opinion upon his motion. But in that very case, after the defendant had appeared and
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had been committed to prison, it was held that he need not be present at the hearing of the motion for a new trial : Rex v. Gibson. 2
Stra. 96 ; . c. Cunningham 29 ; 2 Barnard. 412, 418. See also
1 Chit. Crim. Law 659, 663; The Queen v. Caudiwell, 17 Q. B. 503;
State v. Ril)lon, 2 Bay 99; Jewell v. Commonwealth, 22 Penna.
St. 94, 101; Donnelly v. State, 2 Dutcher 601; Commonwealth
v. Andrews, 97 Mass. 543; Anon., 31 Maine 592.
The only case, cited at the argument, which affirms the right of
the defendant to be personally present at the hearing and overruling
of a motion in his behalf for a new trial, is Hooker v. Commonot'E'ttth, 1-3 Gratt. 763, the decision in which is unsupported by
authority, or by any reasons which should induce this court, in
opposition to the well-established law and practice in this Commonwealth, to hold a sentence to be illegal, simply because the defendant was not personally present at the previous hearing and decision
upon his motion for a new trial, when it does not appear that he
wished to be present, or to be heard in person, or to testify in his
own behalf.
As we are of opinion that the objection cannot be sustained upon
any facts appearing upon the record or stated in the bill of exceptions,
we need not consider whether the question was presented in proper
form to the court below.
Exceptions overruled.
That a prisoner indicted for a capital
felony has a right to be present at every
step of the trial adversely to him, and
that any movement of the government
against him in his absence is erroneous,
*is elementary law.
le must be present at the arraignment: Jacobs v. The Commonwealth, 5
S. & R. 315; h1all v. The State, 40
Ala. 698 ;
When the judge states the evidence
to the jury: l'ade v. The State, 12 Geo.
25 ; Statev. Black-wdlder, I Phillips (N.
C.) 38 ; lWilt v. The State, 5 Coldw. I I;
The People v. Kohler, 5 Cal. 72 ; Jackson v. The Commonwealth, 19 Gratt. 656 ;
When the verdict is returned : King
v. Ladsinghamn, T. Raym. 193; Dunn v.
The Commonwalth, 6 Barr 384; Rose v.
The State, 20 Ohio 31 ; Sargent v. The
State, 11 Id. 472;

And a fortiori when the sentence is
pronounced. In Rex v. Duke, Iolt
399, 1 Salk. 400 (1697), the defendant had been convicted of perjury, and
upon capias he was outlawed for it, and
judgment was moved for in his absence,
but HOLT, C. J., said: "Judgment
cannot be given against any man in his
absence for a corporal punishment. He
must be present when it is done; for
if we should give judgment that he
be put in the pillory, it might be demanded 'When ' and the answer would
be, 'hen they catch him.' " See also
Te People v. Winchell, 7 Cow. 521 ;
Jacobs v. The Commonwealth, 5 S. & R.
315.
And the record of the conviction and
sentence should distinctly and clearly
state that the defendant was present
when the sentence was pronounced, or
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the proceedings will be liable to reversal on a writ of error: Hamilton v.
The Commonwealth, 4 Harris 129; Dunn
v. The Commonwealth, 6 Barr 384; Keely
v. The State, 3 Sm. & Mar. 518 ; Gra/,am v. The State, 40 Ala. 660; The
S:ate v. Matthews, 20 Mo. 55.
In cases not capital, less strictness
perhaps is required in insisting upon a
direct statement in the record of tho defendant's presence. See Holmes v. The
Commonwealth, 25 Penn. St. 221. In
ordinary cases it is sufficient if the presence of the prisoner may be inferred
from the record by fair intenament.
See State v. Craton, 6 Ired. 164;
Stephens v. Ti People, 19 N. Y. 549;
Grimm v. The People, 14 Mich. 300;
State v. Steeffle, 13 Iowa 603.
It does not follow, however, that because a verdict is rendered in the defendant's absence he is to be discharged;
it is merely a mis-trial, and the verdict
should be set aside and the defendant
triedagain : People v..Perkins, I Wend.
91; State v. Hughes, 2 Alabama 102;
Younger v. &tate, 2 W. Va. 579. And
if present when the verdict is returned,
but absent when sentence is pronounced,
he is not entitled to a new trial, but
only to a new sentence. If the former
judgment is reversed on error for the
prisoner's absence, he is simply remanded for sentence according to law : Cole
v. The State, 5 Eng. 318 ; Kelly v. The
State, 3 Sm. & Mar. 518.
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So essential is it deemed that the
prisoner should be present in court
when the verdict is returned (especially
in capital cases), that it has been
thought that neither he nor his counsel
could waive the right, and that it would
be erroneous to proceed without him
even by his own consent. See Nomague
v. The People, Breese 109; Prine v. The
Commonwealth, 6 Harris 103.
But, as held in the principal case, it
is not necessary on hearings in his own
behalf, as on a writ of error, or motion
for a new trial, that he should be personaIly present ; certainly not, if not
confined in jail, but out on bail, and
when his absence is purely voluntary.
See The People v. Clark, I Parker C. C.
360; Rex v. Boltz, 8 D. & R. 65,
where he was in prison and too poorto pay the expenses of bringing him
into oourt.
What has been said above in regard
to the defendant's presence relates to
felonies. In misdemeanors less strictness is required, and the trial may, by
leave of court, often proceed, and the
verdict be rendered, and sentence of a
fine be pronounced, in the defendant's
absence. See United States v. Mayo, I
Curtis C. C. 433; Sou v. 7he People,
12 Wend. 344; Canada v. The Commonwealth, 9 Dana 304; Warren v. The
State, 19 Ark. 214; Holliday v. The
People, 4 Gilman 11.
EDxUND H. BENNETT.

pupreme Court of Miigsippi.
JAMES T. PANT v. THE AUDITOR OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS.
Where the term of a public office is fixed by the constitution the legislature cannot directly or indirectly remove the incumbent. The inability to do so proceeds
rather from the absence of legislative power than from any idea of a contract
between the incumbent and the state.
It is immaterial that the constitution has not prescribed the number of officials
who are to hold for the prescribed term, but has left the number discretionarywith
the legislature. When by law provision has been made for a certain number,
VoL'. XXV.-93
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and they have been lawfully chosen, they are protected for the term, as they would
have been had the constitution itself indicated how many there should be.
Under such circumstances a reduction of the number of officers can only take
effect at the end of the term of existing incumbents.
To take from an officer the authority to perform the duties of the office, is
equivalent to a removal, and consequently is incompetent when a direct removal
is forbidden.
Where therefore the term of oflice of district attorneys was prescribed by the
constitution, and the statute had fixed the number of these officers at thirteen, with
a salary of $1200 each, and the legislature afterwards reduced the districts 'to
eleven, and provided that two of the incumbents should act only in the counties
of their residence respectively, and only in the absence of the district attorney
assigned to the district embracing such county, and should receive a salary of $100
each only : Ifeld, that this action was void, as ai indirect attempt to deprive two
of the incumbents of their offices; and consequently those incumbents were entitled to the salaries previously established.

APPLICATION to compel payment of an official salary.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-The proposition that the legislature cannot
directly or Indirectly remove the incumbent of an office created by
,the constitution during a term 'fixed by that instrument, needs no
argument nor elucidation.
CHALMERS,

If not originally self-evident it has by a long and unbroken series
of decisions become axiomatic. No one will contend, for instance,
that any act of legislation could abridge the term of an incumbent
of the gubernatorial office, or that of the attorney-general or auditor

of public accounts.
No matter what disguise might be adopted or how plausible the
means devised, it would be the duty of this court to scan *rigidly
any act that seemed to contemplate such an end, and to pronoune

void any provision the practical effect of which was to accomplish
such a result.
This doctrine does not proceed upon the idea that the state has
entered into a contract with the incumbent by which she has irrevocably bound herself to accept his services for a specified period;
though it is undoubtedly true that in some sense and for mtny
purposes an office is a contract and the incumbency of it a right of
property which the courts will protect.

But the fundamental principle which prohibits the removal by
legislation of a constitutional officer during a constitutional term,
is that the framers of the organic law, by creating the office and
specifying the term, have unmistakably indicated their will first,
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that the state shall always have such an officer, and, secondly, that
the duration of the term of each incumbent shall depend not on
legislative will, but on the solid basis of an ordinance that cannot
be changed save by a change in the constitution itself.
Incumbency for the prescribed term by each holder of the office
is as important as that the office itself shall exist. The legislature
can no more abridge the one than they can abolish the other.
It is needless to remark that if by any device it is permitted to
oust an officer during his term, full control over the terms is acquired, for if one legislature can eject an obnoxious offictr the succeeding one may dispense with the services of his successor, and
thus, while nominally preserving the term, no incumbent will be
allowed to enjoy it.
The inhibition against this proceeds rather from the absence of
legislative power than from any idea of a contract between the state
and the officeholder.
The correctness of these views will not be questioned where only
one officer of a class is prescribed by the constitution, as in the case
of the governor or attorney-general, nor where a fixed number is
established, as is the case with the judges of this court and the supervisors of the several counties.
But it is suggested that where the constitution merely directs
that a suitable number or a competent number of a certain designated class of officers shall bb elected or appointed, and leaves that
number to be determined by the legislature, the power to establish
carries with it the power to change, and that therefore, even though
a fixed term is prescribed, each legislature must judge of the number needed by the state, and that the judgment of one legislature
on this question cannot bind a succeeding one.
It is said, for instance, that the constitution of this state gives
terms of fixed duration to the judges, chancellors, district attorneys,
.Justices of the peace and constables, but leaves the number of these
officials to be wholly regulated by the legislative will and hence
each legislature must determine for itself how many are necessary.
It is theiefore insisted that whether all incumbents shall remain
in office during the full constitutional terms for which ihey were
chosen, must depend on whether the legislature deems that the state
so long requires the services of the entire number.
This view we deem wholly untenable, because utterly subversive
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of the end intended to be accomplished by the constitutional specification of terms. We cannot doubt that if such had been the intention of the framers of the constitution they would have left the
duration of the terms, as well as the number, of those offices to legislative discretion.
Evidently two antagonistic evils which lurked on either side of
the public weal were intended to be equally guarded against, by
giving to these offices fixed terms, but leaving their number to legislative will. One of these was the imposition on the state of a
horde of superfluous officers, who, holding their places for life or
through long terms prescribed by the body that brought them into
existence, should prove useless and costly burdens on the. state.
The other was the evil to some extent inseparable from republican
institutions which springs from frequent and violent changes in the
offices of the state with every variation in popular caprice.
Both of these ills were guarded against by affixing definite and
short terms to these offices and leaving their number to be deterniined by the legislature. Thus at frequently recurring intervals
the legislature could ascertain how many judges and district attorneys
were necessary, and could order their election or appointment; but
when chosen they must be permitted to serve out the full terns
prescribed by the constitution, unless sooner removed in the modes
pointed out in that instrument.
If the constitution had undertaken to determine the exact number of these offices it might have inflicted on us a number greatly in
excess of our needs, or it might have crippled the entire judiciary
system by a supply totally inadequate to the requirements of the
public service.
On the other hand, if it had left their terms wholly at the legislative mercy, with every change of parties in that body, there would
have been a wholesale change in the judiciary of the state. It is
impossible to imagine anything more disastrous than this to the
welfare of the Commonwealth, and we are unable to perceiVe any
method of avoiding it wiser and better than the one adopted.
We would not abridge the power of the legislature -to decide as
.to the number needed, but'it must be exercised in subordination to
the equally plain requirement that their terms when chosen shall
not be interfered with.
Each clause in the constitution is equally important with every
other clause, and no one clause can be sacrificed to another.
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The authority to determine the number of these officials therefore
must be exercised in harmony with their constitutionally prescribed
terms; and this can only be done by holding that such qetermination must be arrived at before the commencement of the term, and
cannot thereafter be changed until it has expired.
If this construction sometimes inflicts on the state for a few years
one or more supernumerary officers, this is infinitely better than
that this whole class of important officials, comprising almost the
entire body of the judiciary of the state, should be at the mercy of
the dominant party in each successive legislature.
It is said that no system of government is perfect, and that power
must be lodged somewhere. The wisdom of the remark is undoubted,
and its application may be found in the consideration that the legislature will not ordinarily provide for a horde of unnecessary officers,
but if they should do so, the evil need only be endured until the
expiration of the .terms of those first chosen. Then and not till
then the corrective can be applied.
These remarks of course have no application to offices created by
the legislature as to which their power is unlimited.
If this precise question has not heretofore been decided in this
state in a case where the number of officers to be chosen was left to
legislative discretion, the views here announced have been so often
and for so long a period foreshadowed in our decisions that we cannot think that they are novel. either to the profession or to the people at large. They will be found intimated with more or less distinctuess in .Runnels v. T!e State, Walker 146; Hughes v. Buckingham, 5 S. & M. 647; State v. Smedes &' Marshall, 26 Miss.
47; HleAfee v. Russel, 29 Id. 96; Brady v. zlowe, 50 Id. 621;
Cooke v. Newsom, 44 Id. 361; Brady v. West, 50 Id. 68; State
v. .French, 52 Id. 759; Hyde v. The tate, 53 Id.
In other states the exact question has been uniformly settled in
consonance with these views, though not always upon grounds which
meet our entire concurrence. We agree with these cases, however,
in the result reached, namely, that a constitutional term is as much
beyond legislative interference where the legislature has the power
to fix the number of officers as where the number is fixed in the
organic law: People v. Dubois, 23 Ill. 547; Commonwealth v.
a-amble, 62 Penn. St. 43; Lowe v. Commonwealth, 8 Metc. (Ky.)
State v. Atessmorej 14 Wis. 163.
237;
Having
arrived at the conclusion that no incumbent of a
consti-
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tutional office can be displaced during the continuance of a constitutional term, and that this principle is in no manner affected by
the delegation to the legislature of the power to determine the number of officers required by the necessities of the state, let us apply
this principle to the case at bar, keeping in view the further proposition that a constitutional inhibition of a certain result includes
every possible method by which that result can be accomplished.
The relator was elected to the office of district attorney of the
tenth judicial district for the constitutional term of four years, at
the general election in November 1875, and having been duly commissioned, entered upon the duties of his office in January 1876.
This term will expire 1st of January 1880.
There were at the date of his election thirteen judicial districts
in the state, and there was one district attorney for each. They
were each entitled, by the law then and still in force, .to an annual
salary of 1200, besides fees of office.
During the spring of 1876 the terms of office of all the circuit
judges in the state expired, and the legislature perceiving that there
was no necessity for so many as thirteen, on the 4th of April 1876
passed an act by which the number of the districts wad reduced from
thirteen to eleven, but they were careful to provide by a supplemental act that it would' not take effect until the expiration of the
terms of judges then.in office. In the appointment of their successors, eleven judges only were commissioned, but no provision having been made with reference to the district attorneys, there were
left in office three more of these oficers than there were districts.
To remedy this supposed evil, the legislature, at its next session,
passed an act entitled "An act to assign district attorneys in the
judicial districts of the state." Approved February 1st 1876
In the changes in the boundaries of the districts produced by the
Act of April 1876, two or more district attorneys had been in some
instances thrown into one district, while in other districts none were
left.
The object of the Act of February 1~t 1877 was twofold; first,
to have one district attorney assigned to each district, and, second,
to rid the public treasury as far as possible of the burden of supernumeraries.
This assignment was ordered to be made by the governor, who
was directed by the law that where only one district attorney resided in a district he should be retained, and that where two or more
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resided in the same district, that one should be retained that had
been voted for by the electors of a plurality of the counties in the district. Those who should under this arrangement be left unassigned
were not by special enactment displaced from office, but they were
left without any duties or any territory within. which they could
officially act, except that it was provided that they might officiate
in the counties of their residence in the absence of the assigned
officer.
The salaries of the unassigned officials were fixed at $100, while
those of the others were left at $1200. The fees of the office would
of course belong to the officers left on active duty.
The relator, Fant, was unassigned. He brings this writ of mandamus to compel the payment of his full salary of $1200, and it is
agreed by counsel that we shall consider and pass upon the constitutionality of the Act of February 1877, without regard to matters
of form.
It is at once evident that we are not called upon to pass upon
the constitutionality of so much of the act as directs the assignment
of district attorneys, except in so far as its effect is to displace some
incumbent, and it is unnecessary therefore to decide whether such
assignments are valid in districts where no collisions are created.
We would remark, however, that we are not inclined to adopt the
views Announced by some of the courts to the effect that an officer
can have a vested territorial right in the particular counties composing the district in which he was elected. We entertain no doubt
of the legislative power to change the boundaries of districts.
Let us inquire into the validity of the act with reference to those
officers left unassigned. It is evident that its constitutionality in
this respect must depend on whether it amounts to a practical displacement of such officers.
Sect. 25 of art. 6 of the constitution is in these words: "There
shall be an attorney-general elected by the qualified electors of
the state, and a competent number of district attorneys shall be
elected by the qualified electors of the respective districts, whose
term of service shall be four years and whose duty and compensation
shall be prescribed by law."
It will be noted that full authority is confided to the legislature
to regulate the duties and compensation of the district attorneys and
to create the districts in which they shall be elected. Their term
alone seems to be beyond legislative control.
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But a grant of power to regulate specified matters of detail, so
far from including the authority to abolish them, ambunts frequently to an express negation of authority. Thus when it is in
effect declared by this section that the legislature may prescribe the
duties and compensation of district attorneys and lay off their districts, it is an implied prohibition of the power to deprive them of
all duties and all compensation and leave them without districts.
It may enlarge or curtail their districts, but it must leave some
district. It may add to or subtract from their duties, but it must
leave some duties. It may increase or diminish their compensation,
but it must leave some compensation.
It is evident that the law in question violates, with reference to
the relator, two of these requirements. It has left him neither
district nor duties. There is not a court in the state in which he
has the right to prosecute a criminal or enter a nolleprosequi. There
is not a grand jury room in which his presence would not be an
unauthorized and unlawful intrusion.
He may indeed, in the absence of the district attorney, who has
been assigned to his district, appear in the county of his residence,
but this is wholly independent of his own volition or that of the
presiding judge, and rests wholly on the caprice or convenience of
the assigned officer. Certainly this is neither giving him a district
nor permitting him to exercise any of the duties of office.If he can be said to be an officer at all he certainly occupies a
most anomalous position.
Can a man be said to be an officer of the state when there is not
within the limits a spot where he is allowed to perform any function
of the office which he is supposed to fill ? Has not the relator been
as effectually removed from office as if the legislature had declared
in explicit terms that from and after a certain date James T. Fant
should cease to be a district attorney? To ask these questions is*
to answer them. We conclude, therefore, that the act is clearly
unconstitutional in depriving him of the right to perform any
official acts.
But 't is said that the legislature has the right to diminish his
compensation at pleasure, that a salary of $100 per annum has been
left him, and that as this writ is only prosecuted to assert a right to
an undiminished salary, we can consider no other question than
this.
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The point is not free from difficulty and has cost us much thought.
It is true that the legislature has full control over the salary as well
as over the duties and the districts. We are not prepared to say
that it may not graduate the compensation according to the labor
imposed, and if it had seen fit to reduce the tenth district to a single
county and to have fixed the salary of the incumbent at $100, we
are not prepared to say that the act would have been invalid, though
upon this point we express no opinion, because it may be that the
framers of the constitution, in speaking of the districts of district
attorneys, must, in view of the past history of the state, be held to
have contemplated districts co-extensive with the territory presided
over by a single circuit judge.
But we are not presented such a case and we must look at the
whole law in its practical effects on the relator.
He has neither duties nor district, and the salary left him must
therefore be regarded either as a pension or as a compensation for
possible duties which he may never be called upon to perform. In
either aspect it is wholly at war with the genius of our institutions.
The legislature has exclusive control over the salary of the attorneygeneral. Suppose then that it should enact that all the duties of
that officer shouldbe performed by the district attorney residing in
the Jackson district, but in the absence of that officer the attorneygeneral might continue to act, and that his salary should be $100,
could this court hesitate td declare such an act unconstitutional ?
And yet that is, mutatiR mutandi, the case at bar.
By sect. 7 of art. 12, it is made the duty of the legislature "to
provide suitable compensation for all officers."
It would be an exceedingly delicate matter for this court to
declare, that the compensation provided for any officer was not
suitable, and would certainly never do so, where the salary, however
low, had been fixed on a basis deemed by the legislature to be sufficient, but where it was clearly not so fixed, but was a mere partisan
device to get rid of an obnoxious officer, it might be our duty to
interfere.
Suppos6 for instance, that a legislature dominated by a political
party different from that of the officers belonging to the state departments in the capitol should reduce their salaries to five dollars per
'annum. In such a case we might feel compelled to interpose.
VOL.
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We rest our objection, however, to the law under review upon
the ground that it is clearly unconstitutional, in depriving the relator of both duties and a district, and inasmuch as the compensation left is manifestly based upon this absence of duties, it must be
condemned also.
We cannot imagine, for a moment, that the legislature would
have prescribed such a salary except upon the idea that the remaining portions of the act were valid, and inasmuch as the one is
dependent upon the other, they must stand or fall together. While
it is true that one portion of a law may be upheld while the rest is
overthrown, this is only true when they are so far independent
propositions that it may be presumed that the legislature intended
one to subsist even though the balance perished.
But where the entire scheme must fail because of want of power
to enact it, there can be no possible good in upholding an isolated
provision which was perhaps competent for the lawgiver to enact,
but which is unreasonable and unjust if left to stand alone.
Some years ago this court pronounced unconstitutional a statute
which undertook to create the office of tax-collector in the several
counties, and to deprive the sheriffs of the duty of collecting the
public revenue. Suppose that there had been a salary attached to
the collection of taxes and that this act had contained a provision
that thereafter the sheriffs should receive no such salary. Such a
clause by itself would have been constitutional. But can there- be
any doubt that it-would have fallen with the balance of .the act,
and that the sheriff who in defiance of the act had collected the
taxes would have been entitled to the salary? The principle is
that where a particular clause of the statute is manifestly based
upon certain other clauses, which are pronounced unconstitutional,
it will fall with'them, though itself not obnoxious t constitutional
objections.
If the legislature annex certain duties to a particular office, with
an added compensation therefor, and the addition of the duties is
declared unconstitutional, it is manifest that the officer cannot claim
the compensation.
The converse of the proposition must also be true, that if they
attempt to strip an officer of all duty, and consequently, and as
part of the same act, abolish his salary, he will not lose the salary,
even though they had a right to abolish it, if the attempt to strip
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him of duties was invalid. The two are so dependent, each upon
the other, that they must stand or fall together.
The reader of the foregoing opinion
will naturally call to mind the instances
in which judges chosen for a constitutional term have been deprived of their
offices 'by a legislative act abolishing
the courts. The cases here particularly
referred to are the repeal of the act
creating United States district courts at
the close of the administration of John
Adams, and the acts previously passed
in Maryland and Virginia, and after.
wards in the New England states, during
the pendency of the war of 1812, by
which courts composed of judges obnoxious to the existing political majority wwere legislated out of existence. In
those cases, however, the rightfulness
of the legislation was not judicially
passed upon, for the reason that, with
both the legislative and executive departments of the government refusing
to recognise the judges thus legislated
against, redress, if they were wronged,
was practically Impossible. Any court
is powerless when it thus stands'alone.
Some cases are referred to in the
abdfre opinion which have considerable
analogy to the one decided. In Commonwealth v. Gamble, 63 Penn. St. 343,
where a judge had'been commissioned
to hold for a constitutional term of ten
years, "if he should behave himself
well," it was held that the legislature
had no power to determine that a
breach in this condition had occurred,
and that an act annexing the judge's
district to that of another judge, thereby
depriving him of his office, was void.
In the course of the opinion the court
seems like a solecism to
say: "I
regard thai to be an office in this
country to, which there are no duties
assigned. 'An office,' says Kent (vol.
3, p. 454), 'consists in a right and correspondent duty to execute a public or
private trust and to take -the emoluments.' 11 People v. Dubois, 23 Ill.

547, was somewhat similar on its facts,
and the conclusion was the same. See
also Howard v. State, 10 Ind. 99; State
v.
iltz, 11 La. Ann. 439 ; People v.
Kelsey, 34 Cal. 470. The case of State
v. 31essmore, 14 Wis. 163, is not so
directly in point, but the principle declared is substantially the same, and
this was followed in State v. Brunst, 26
Wis. 412, by the decision that the legislature cannot take from a constitutional
officer the duties and functions usually
pertaining to his office, and confer them
upon an officer appointed in a different
manner and holding office by a different
tenure. The office in question was that
of sheriff, and the duties and functions
of which he was to be deprived were
those regarding the custody and care
of prisoners sentenced to the county
jail. Warner v. People, 2 Denio 272,
is some authority for this conclusion,
and the case of King v. Hunter, 65 N. C.
603, decides that where one of the duties
of the office of sheriff was the collection
of taxes, the legislature could not provide for the appointment of a tax-collector io whom those duties should be
transferred from the incumbent in office
when the act was passed. The doctrine
declared is obviously the same with that
on which is rested the principal case.
The cases of People v. Bull, 46 N. Y.
57, and People v. McKinney, 52 Id.
374, have also some bearing, in this :
that they both hold that the legislature
cannot by indirection avoid and defeat
a constitutional provision. In both it
was held that where an office was by
the constitution to be filled by popular
election the legislature could not prolong the term of an incumbent ; this
being equivalent to a legislative election for the enlarged term. Compare
Oregon v. Pyle, 1 Ore. 149. In Allen
v. .AfcKeen, 1 Sumner 276, an inclination was evinced to hold that one hold-
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ing an office for the term of good behavior was to be regarded as holding by
contract with the state for that term.
But see Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How.
402 ; Barker v. Pittsburgh, 4 Penn. St.
49; Conner v. New York, 2 Sandf. 353;
s. c. in error, 5 N. Y. 285 ; Bryan v.
Cattell, 15 Iowa 538 ; Peoplev. Haskell,
5 Cal. 357 ; Darb v. Houston, 22 Geo.
506; Wilcox v. Rodman, 46 Mo. 323;
Perkins v. Corbin, 45 Ala. 103; Taft

v. Adams, 3 Gray 126; Standjford v.
Wingate, 2 Duvall 443; Robinson v.
Vhite, 26 Ark. 139 ; Oregon v. Pyle,
1 Ore. 149 ; Alexander v. McKenzie, 2
S. C. N. S. 81. Where the term of
office is prescribed by law, the appointing power cAnnot limit it to a shorter
term by a provision in -the commission
or appointment: Stadler v. Detroit, 13
Mich. 346.
T. M. C.

Supreme Court of 'ermont.
BRAGG v. MORRILL.
The vendor of an article sold for a particular purpose does not impliedly warrant it against latent defects to him unknown, and caused by the unskilfulness or
negligence of the manufacturer or previous owner, except when the sale is, in
itself, equivalent to an affirmation that the article has certain inherent qualities
inconsistent with the alleged defects. Thus, when defendant, a machinist and
founder, sold a piece of wrought iron shafting, of which he was not the maker,
but which he turned and prepared for the reception of pulleys, and which he supposed to be sound, to be used in running machinery in a carriage shop, and the
shaft upon being put to the described use broke because of a flaw and an imperfect
weld, it was held that there was no implied warranty of its soundness.

AssumPsrr upon a warranty of a piece of wrought iron shafting.
The case was referred, and the court rendered judgment on the report for the defendant. Exceptions by the plaintiff. The case
appears from the opinion.
Young, for the plaintiff, cited Beal v. Olmstead, 24 Vt. 114;
Pease v. Sabin, 38 Id. 432; Jones v. Bright, 5 Bing. 533 ; Brown
v. Edgington, 2 M. & G. 279; Shepherd v. P3ybus, 3 Id. 868;
Gtray v. Cox, 4 B. & C. 108; 1 Parsons Cont. 469.
-Edwardsand Dickerman, for the defendant, cited Goslin v. Hodson and Pisk,.24 Vt. 140; Paddock v. Strobridge, 29 Id. 470;

Sanbbrn v. HZerring et al., 6 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 457; Emerton v.
Mathews, 1 Id. 231 ; Bradfordv. Manly, 13 Mass. 139 ; Brown v.
.Edgington, 2 M. & G. 279; Bluett v. Osborne, 1 Stark. 384.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Ross, J.-The plaintiff claims to recover of the defendant damages sustained by two defects-one an imperfect weld and the other
a flaw-in a wrought iron shaft, twenty-four feet long and two
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• inches in diameter, that he purchased of the defendant. The defendant did not manufacture the shaft, further than to turn it the
whole length, so that the plaintiff could attach pulleys to it at any
point he chose. There is no complaint that the defendant did not
properly perform what work he did upon the shaft. The defects in
the shaft were alike unknown to the defendant and the plaintiff,
and seem not to have been discoverable by any ordinary inspection
or examination. The defendant, at the time of the sale, was carrying on the business of a foundry and machine shop, and held himself out as skilled in whatever pertained to that business. - He was
informed that the plaintiff desired to purchase the shaft for the purpose of attaching various pulleys for the propulsion of such machines
as he should wish to use in the manufacture of carriages, but it is
not found that the defendant was informed of the exact position in
which it was to be hung, or what particular machines it was expected to propel. The sale of the shaft was by the pound, with an
agreed price per day that the defendant should charge for the time
required to turn and fit it. The defendant had nothing to do with
the hanging of the shaft. There was no express warranty nor undertaking by the defendant in regard to the shaft. It was of the
required size and length.- The question presented is, whether on
these facts the law implies a warranty by the defendant against
latent defects occasioned by it& imperfect manufacture before it
ca~pe into the hands of the .defendant. The general doctrine that
the vendor of an article, manufactured by him for a particular purpose, impliedly warrants it against all such.defects as arise from his
unskilfulness either in seldcting the materials or in putting them
together and adapting them to the required purposes, is well established. It is immaterial whether the manufacture of the article
precedes or follows the sale, provided the vendor is the manufacturer:
Beats v. Olmetead, 24 Vt. 114; Pease v. Sabin, 38 Id. 432; Jon
v. Bright, 5 Bing. 533.
For analogous reasons, where the sale is by sample, the vendor
impliedly warrants "that the article sold shall correspond with the
sample in.kind and quality: Bradford' v. Manly, 13 Mass. 139.
But says.PRKER, C. J., in delivering the opinion in that case:
"That there is not an unknown and invisible defect, owing to natural causes or to previous management of some former dealer, he
may not be presumed to affirm when he shows the sample; and as
to these particulars, an express warranty may be required consist-

BRAGG v. MORRILL.

ently with confidence in the fair dealing of the vendor :" Parkinson
v. Lee, 2 East 314.
Generally, in all sales of provisions, there is a like inplied warranty that they are wholesome: 1 Parsons Cont. 470, and notes.
But this doctrine has exceptions, and is held applicable only when
the vendor is the producer, or when he exposes them for sale for
domestic use as a provision dealer: Bunby v. Ballett, 16 M. & W.
644; Emerson v. Brigham, 10 Mass. 197; .Emertonv. Mathews,
Exchequer, 1861, 1 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 281. In the case last
cited, the plaintiff was a butcher and retailer of meat, and the defendant was a commission salesman of meat in Newgate market. The
defendant exposed a carcass for sale that appeared sound and wholesome, and sold the same to the plaintiff. The plaintiff cut up the
carcass and sold portions of it to some of his customers. On being
cooked, it proved unfit for food. The court held that the defendant
was not liable on an implied warranty that it was wholesome, and
that the doctrine of implied warranty did not apply to a commission salesman. The plaintiff relies much on the leading case of
Jones v. Bright, supra. In that case, the defendant was the manufacturer of the copper sheathing which proved defective through
some imperfection in the manufacture. Gray v. Cox,4 B. & C.
108, is like Jones v. Bright, save in the single particular that the
defendant did not manufacture the copper sheathing which proved
defective, and was held by the sale not to have impliedly warranted
it against a latent defect occasioned by unakilfulness in its manufacture. We think the result of the cases on implied warranty-is,
that the vendor of an article for a particular purpose does not
impliedly warrant it against latent defects unknown to him, and
which have been produced through the unskilfulness of some previous manufacturer or owner, without his knowledge or fault,
except in those cases wherb the sale of the article by him is, in
and of itself, legally equivalent to a positive, affirmation that the
article has certain inherent qualities inconsistent with the claimed
defects, as is the case in the sale of provisions for domestic use.
On this ground, the defendant is not liable on an implied warranty
of the shaft for the latent defects that caused it to break, and were
wholly unknown to him, and were not produced through any fault
or unskilfulness on his part, but wholly through the fault or unakilfulness of the manufacturer of the shaft from the raw material.
Judgment affirmed.

WHITE v. STATE OF INDIANA.

Supreme Court of lIndiana.
ROBERT WHITE v. STATE OF INDIATNA.
A defendant in a criminal case who is made a competent witness by statute, may
teitify to his intent in doing the act charged as a crime. The fact that intention is
incapable by its nature of being known positively to other persons, and therefore
can only be proved iferentially does not affect the rule allowing a witness to testify.

APPEAL from Miami Circuit Court. At the April Term 1876
of the Miami Circuit Court, the appellant was indicted for grand
larceny. The indictment charged that the appellant did unlawfully
and feloniously steal, take and carry away fifty pounds of bacon, of
the value of $7.50, of the personal goods and chattels of one Noah
W. Trissall. There was a plea of not guilty and on the trial there
was a verdict of guilty. A motion for a new trial was overruled
and judgment rendered on the verdict.

J. L. _Parrarand J. Farrar,for appellant.
C. A. Buskirk, Attorney-General, for the state.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
NIBLACK, J.-One of the errors assigned is the refusal of the

court below to grant a-new trial, as prayed for by the appellant. The
first reason assigned in support of the motion for a new trial was the
exclusion by the court of certain testimony offered by the appellant.
The appellant was examined as a witness on the trial in his own
behalf, and testified, amongst other things, as to the circumstances
under which he came into the possession of the meat which it was
alleged he had stolen. His attorney inquired of him in substance
what his intention was, if he had any at the time of receiving said
meat, in regard to taking and converting the same to his own use.
Objection was made to that question because, as was alleged, the
intention which the appellant may have then had was not a subjectifatter of proof in that way. The objection was sustained and the
proposed testimony excluded. It was the exclusion of this testimony
of which the appellant complained in his motion for a new trial.
In the case of Green v. The State, decided at the November Term
1876, this court held that in a criminal proceeding where the intent
is the gist of the offence charged, the defendant is a competent
witness to testify as to the intention with which lie did the alleged
criminal act; that the objection, -ifany, to such testimony must go

